We consider three channel models: the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, and the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, when no eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitters. In each case, we establish the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) by providing achievable schemes and matching converses. We show that the unavailability of the eavesdropper's CSIT does not reduce the s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with helpers. However, there is loss in s.d.o.f. for both the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper. In particular, we show that in the absence of eavesdropper's CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers from a sum s.d.o.f. perspective, and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. reduces from
Introduction
The availability of channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) plays a crucial role in securing wireless communication in the physical layer. In most practical scenarios, the in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. In order to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f., we propose achievable schemes and provide matching converse proofs for each of these channel models. We note that any achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers is also an achievable scheme for the K-user multiple access wiretap channel. Further, a converse for the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is an upper bound for the wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers as well. Thus, we provide achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with helpers and a converse for the multiple access wiretap channel. We consider both fixed and fading channel gains. For the wiretap channel with helpers and the multiple access wiretap channel, we present schemes based on real interference alignment [6] and vector space alignment [7] for fixed and fading channel gains, respectively. For the interference channel, our achievable schemes are based on asymptotic real alignment [6, 8] and asymptotic vector space alignment [7] for fixed and fading channel gains, respectively. For every channel model, we design our achievable schemes such that, the structure of the real alignment based scheme for the case of fixed channel gains is similar to that of the vector space alignment based scheme for the case of fading channels. Thus, our achievable schemes indicate a loose correspondence between the real and vector space alignment techniques.
For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, as in [5] , every transmitter sacrifices a part of its message space to transmit cooperative jamming signals in the form of artificial noise. However, instead of one artificial noise block as in [5] , our scheme requires two noise blocks from each transmitter. The 2K noise blocks from the K transmitters are then aligned at each legitimate receiver to occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions out of the full space of 2K dimensions, thus, achieving .
Related Work
The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel is established in [11, 12] . The s.d.o.f. of the single antenna Gaussian wiretap channel [13] , and its variants [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] with different fading models and CSI availability conditions, is zero. In multi-user scenarios, however, positive s.d.o.f. values can be achieved. Each transmitters may have independent messages of its own, as in multiple access wiretap channels introduced in [19, 20] and interference channels with confidential messages introduced in [21] , or may act as helpers as in [22, 23] . While cooperative jamming strategies can improve the achievable rates [19] , i.i.d. Gaussian cooperative jamming signals limit the decoding performance of the legitimate receiver as well, and the s.d.o.f. achieved is still zero. Positive s.d.o.f. can be obtained by either structured signaling [24] or non-i.i.d. Gaussian signaling [25] . The exact optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with M helpers and the K-user multiple access wiretap channel are established to be . A related line of research investigates the wiretap channel, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast channel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper [27] [28] [29] , when the eavesdropper CSIT is not available. The eavesdropper's channel is assumed to be arbitrary, without any assumptions on its distribution, and security is guaranteed for every realization of the eavesdropper's channel. This models an exceptionally strong eavesdropper, which may control its own channel in an adversarial manner. Hence, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in each case with single antenna terminals, since the eavesdropper's channel realizations may be exactly equal to the legitimate user's channel realizations. On the other hand, in our model, the eavesdropper's channel gains are drawn from a known distribution, though the realizations are not known at the transmitters. We show that, with this mild assumption, strictly positive s.d.o.f. can be achieved even with single antennas at each transmitter and receiver for almost all channel realizations for helper, multiple access, and interference networks.
System Model and Definitions
In this paper, we consider three fundamental channel models: the wiretap channel with helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper. For each channel model, we consider two scenarios of channel variation: a) fixed channel gains, and b) fading channel gains. For the case of fixed channel gains, we assume that the channel gains are non-zero and have been drawn independently from a continuous distribution with bounded support and remain fixed for the duration of the communication. On the other hand, in the fading scenario, we assume that the channel gains are non-zero and are drawn from a common continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion in each channel use. The common continuous distribution is known at all the terminals in the system.
Let Ω denote the collection of all channel gains in n channel uses. We assume full CSI at the receivers, that is, both the legitimates receivers and the eavesdropper know Ω. In the following subsections we describe each channel model and provide the relevant definitions.
Wiretap Channel with Helpers
The wiretap channel with M helpers, see Fig. 1 , is described by,
where X 1 (t) denotes the channel input of the legitimate transmitter, and Y (t) denotes the channel output at the legitimate receiver, at time t. X(i), i = 2, . . . , M + 1, are the channel inputs of the M helpers, and Z(t) denotes the channel output at the eavesdropper, at time t. In addition, N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are white Gaussian noise variables with zero-mean and unitvariance. Here, h i (t), g i (t) are the channel gains of the users to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and g i (t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are subject to the average power constraint E[X i (t) 2 ] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . , M + 1.
The legitimate transmitter wishes to transmit a message W which is uniformly distributed in W. A secure rate R, with R = log |W| n is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W =Ŵ ] ≤ ǫ n , and the secrecy constraint, namely,
where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. The supremum of all achievable secure rates R is the secrecy
Figure 2: K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
capacity C s and the s.d.o.f., d s , is defined as
Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The K-user multiple access wiretap channel, see Fig. 2 , is described by,
where X i (t) denotes the ith user's channel input, Y (t) denotes the legitimate receiver's channel output, and Z(t) denotes the eavesdropper's channel output, at time t. In addition, N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are white Gaussian noise variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. Here, h i (t), g i (t) are the channel gains of the users to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and g i (t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are subject to the average power constraint
The ith user transmits message W i which is uniformly distributed in W i . A secure rate tuple (R 1 , . . . , R K ), with R i = log |W i | n is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W i =Ŵ i ] ≤ ǫ n , for i = 1, . . . , K, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. Here, W K 1 denotes the set of all the messages, i.e., {W 1 , . . . , W K }. 
Interference Channel with External Eavesdropper
The K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, see Fig. 3 , is described by
where Y i (t) is the channel output of receiver i, Z(t) is the channel output at the eavesdropper, X j (t) is the channel input of transmitter j, h ji (t) is the channel gain from transmitter j to receiver i, g j (t) is the channel gain from transmitter j to the eavesdropper, and {N 1 (t), . . . , N K (t), N Z (t)} are mutually independent zero-mean unit-variance white Gaussian noise random variables, at time t. The channel gains to the eavesdropper, g i (t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are subject to the average power constraint
Transmitter i wishes to send a message W i , chosen uniformly from a set W i , to receiver i. The messages W 1 , . . . , W K are mutually independent. A secure rate tuple (R 1 , . . . , R K ), with R i = log |W i | n is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at all the legitimate receivers, namely, Pr[W i =Ŵ i ] ≤ ǫ n , for i = 1, . . . , K, and the security condition
where
Main Results and Discussion
In this section, we state the main results of this paper. We have the following theorems:
Theorem 1 For the wiretap channel with M helpers and no eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f., d s , is given by,
almost surely, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
Theorem 2 For the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f., d s , is given by,
Theorem 3 For the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper with no eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f., d s , is given by,
We present the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 4 and the proof of Theorem 3 in Section 5. Let us first state a corollary obtained from Theorems 1 and 2, which establishes the entire s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT.
Corollary 1
The s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT is given by,
The proof of Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2. In particular, we can treat the K-user multiple access wiretap channel as a (K − 1) helper wiretap channel with transmitter i as the legitimate transmitter, and the remaining transmitters as helpers. This 
We present the proof of Theorem 4 in Section 6. In this case, we note that when only one user has eavesdropper CSIT, i.e., m = 1, our achievable rate is the same as when no user has eavesdropper CSIT as in Theorem 2. On the other hand, when all users have eavesdropper CSIT, i.e., m = K, our achievable rate is the same as the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in [2] . We note that our achievable sum s.d.o.f. varies from the no eavesdropper CSIT result in Theorem 2 to the full eavesdropper CSIT sum s.d.o.f. in [2] as m increases from 1 to K.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
First, we note that an achievable scheme for Theorem 1 implies an achievable scheme for Theorem 2, since the K-user multiple access wiretap channel may be treated as a wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers. Further, we note that a converse for Theorem 2 suffices as a converse for Theorem 1. Thus, we will only provide achievable schemes for Theorem 1 and a converse proof for Theorem 2. An alternate converse for Theorem 1 also follows from the converse presented in [2] for the wiretap channel with M helpers and with eavesdropper CSIT, as the converse for the case of known eavesdropper CSIT serves as a converse for the case of unknown eavesdropper CSIT.
Achievability for the Wiretap Channel with Helpers
We now present achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with M helpers for both fixed and fading channels. We begin with the case of fixed channel gains.
Fixed Channel Gains
For fixed channels, we use the technique of real interference alignment [6, 8] 
} be mutually independent discrete random variables, each of which uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a, Q)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the transmission power, and is also the minimum distance between the points belonging to C(a, Q). Exact values of a and Q will be specified later. We choose the input signal of the legitimate transmitter as
k=2 are rationally independent among themselves and also rationally independent of all channel gains. The input signal of the jth helper, j = 2, · · · , M + 1, is chosen as
Note that, neither the legitimate transmitter signal in (17) nor the helper signals in (18) depend on the eavesdropper CSI {g k } M +1
k=1 . With these selections, observations of the receivers are given by,
The intuition here is as follows: We use M independent sub-signals V k , k = 2, · · · , M + 1, to represent the original message W . The input signal X 1 is a linear combination of V k s and a jamming signal U 1 . At the legitimate receiver, all of the cooperative jamming signals, U k s, are aligned such that they occupy a small portion of the signal space. Since {1, h 1 α 2 , h 1 α 3 , · · · , h 1 α M +1 } are rationally independent for all channel gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the signals
j=1 U j can be distinguished by the legitimate receiver. In addition, we observe that
are rationally independent, and therefore, {U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U M +1 } span the entire space at the eavesdropper; see Fig. 4 . Here, by the entire space, we mean the maximum number of dimensions that the eavesdropper is capable of decoding, which is (M + 1) in this case. Since the entire space at the eavesdropper is occupied by the cooperative jamming signals, the message signals {V 2 , V 3 , · · · , V M +1 } are secure, as we will mathematically prove in the sequel.
The following secrecy rate is achievable [12] 
Note that since Ω is known at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, it can be considered to be an additional output at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Further, since V is chosen to be independent of Ω, Ω should appear in the conditioning of each of the mutual information quantities in (21) . We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity.
First, we use Fano's inequality to bound the first term in (21) . Note that the space observed at receiver 1 consists of (2Q + 1) M (2MQ + 2Q + 1) points in (M + 1) dimensions, and the sub-signal in each dimension is drawn from a constellation of C(a, (M + 1)Q). Here, we use the property that C(a, Q) ⊂ C(a, (M + 1)Q). By using the Khintchine-Groshev Figure 4 : Illustration of the alignment scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers with no eavesdropper CSI.
theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory [6, 8] , we can bound the minimum distance d min between the points in receiver 1's space as follows: For any δ > 0, there exists a constant k δ such that
for almost all rationally independent {1, h 1 α 2 , h 1 α 3 , · · · , h 1 α M +1 }, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM scheme by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1,
whereV is the estimate of V by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on observation Y . For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P 1−δ 2(M +1+δ) and a = γP 1 2 /Q, where γ is a constant independent of P , then
and we can have P V =V → 0 as P → ∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the transmitters, we can simply choose
By Fano's inequality and the Markov chain V → Y →V, we know that
where δ and γ are fixed, and o(·) is the little-o function. This means that
Next, we need to bound the second term in (21),
where (41) is due to the fact that given V and Z, the eavesdropper can decode U with probability of error approaching zero since
are rationally independent for all channel gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Then, by Fano's inequality, H(U|Z, V) ≤ o(log P ) similar to the step in (30) . In addition, h(Z) ≤ 1 2 log P + o(log P ) in (42), since all the channel gains are drawn from a known distribution with bounded support.
Combining (35) and (44), we have
where again o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we can achieve
f. for this model where there is no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters.
Fading Channel Gains
Now, we present an achievable scheme for the case of fading channel gains, i.e., when the channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion from one time slot to another. In this scheme, the legitimate transmitter sends M independent Gaussian symbols, V = {V 2 , . . . , V M +1 } securely to the legitimate receiver in (M + 1) time slots. This is done as follows: At time t = 1, . . . , M + 1, the legitimate transmitter sends a scaled artificial noise, i.e., cooperative jamming, symbol U 1 along with information symbols as,
where the α k (t)s are chosen such that the (M + 1)
, is full rank. The jth helper, j = 2, . . . , M + 1, transmits:
The channel outputs at time t are,
Note the similarity of the scheme with that of the real interference scheme for fixed channel gains, i.e., the similarity between (50)- (51) and (19)- (20) . Indeed the alignment structure after (M + 1) channel uses is exactly as in Fig. 4 . Note also how the artificial noise symbols align at the legitimate receiver over (M + 1) time slots. At high SNR, at the end of the (M + 1) slots, the legitimate receiver recovers (M + 1) linearly independent equations with (M + 1) variables: 
. N 1 and N 2 are (M + 1) dimensional vectors containing the noise variables N 1 (t) and N 2 (t), respectively, for t = 1, . . . , M + 1. To calculate differential entropies, we use the following lemma.
T be a jointly
Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance P I. Also, let N = (N 1 , . . . , N M ) T be a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance σ 2 I, independent of X. If
We present the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A. Using Lemma 1, we compute
where (56) follows since U and N 1 are independent of V and since (A V , A U ) has rank (M + 1), and (57) follows since A U has rank 1. We also have,
where we have used the fact that both (B V , B U ) and B U have rank (M + 1), almost surely.
Note that, in both calculations above, we have implicitly used the fact that Ω is known to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and that it appears in the conditioning of each mutual information and differential entropy term. Equation (62) means that the leakage to the eavesdropper does not scale with log P . Now, consider the vector wiretap channel from V to Y and Z, by treating the K slots in the scheme above as one channel use. Similar to (21) , the following secrecy rate is achievable
Since each channel use of this vector channel uses (M +1) actual channel uses, the achievable rate for the actual channel is,
Thus, the achievable s.d.o.f. of this scheme is
. The results in (47) and (65) complete the achievability of Theorem 1, for fixed and fading channel gains, respectively.
Converse for the Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
We combine techniques from [2] and [9] to prove the converse. Here, we use X i to denote the collection of all channel inputs {X i (t), t = 1, . . . , n} of transmitter i. Similarly, we use Y and Z to denote the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, over n channel uses. We further define X K 1 as the collection of all channel inputs from all of the transmitters, i.e., {X i , i = 1 . . . , K}. Finally, for a fixed j, we use X −j to denote all channel inputs from all transmitters except transmitter j, i.e., {X i , i = j, i = 1 . . . , K}. Since all receivers know Ω, it appears in the conditioning in every entropy and mutual information term below. We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity. We divide the proof into three steps.
Deterministic Channel Model
We will show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the following integer-input integeroutput deterministic channel in (66)-(67) instead of the one in (5)-(6)
with the constraint that
To that end, we will show that given any codeword tuple (X G 1 , . . . , X G K ) for the original channel of (5)- (6), we can construct a codeword tuple (X
for the deterministic channel of (66) (5)- (6), when (X
Similarly, define
It suffices to show that
for every i = 1, . . . , K. Here, (73) states that the information rate to the legitimate receiver in the discretized channel is at least as large as the information rate in the original Gaussian channel, and (74) states that the information leakage to the eavesdropper in the discretized channel is at most at the level of the information leakage in the original Gaussian channel, both of which quantified within a o(log P ). The proof of (73) follows along similar lines as the proof presented in [9] and is omitted here. To prove (74), we first definē
Then, we have,
lowing the steps of the proof in [9, Appendix A.2]. In addition, recalling that Ω appears in the conditioning of each term in (83), note that
is integer valued and is bounded by
Therefore, the s.d.o.f. of the deterministic channel in (66)-(67) with integer channel inputs as described in (68) is no smaller than the s.d.o.f. of the original channel in (5)- (6) . Consequently, any upper bound (e.g., converse) developed for the s.d.o.f. of (66)-(67) will serve as an upper bound for the s.d.o.f. of (5)- (6) . Thus, we will consider this deterministic channel in the remaining part of the converse.
An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [2] , i.e., [2, Lemma 1] . Note that, unlike [2, Lemma 1], channel inputs are integer here and satisfy (68):
where (91) follows since H(Y, Z|X K 1 ) = 0 for the channel in (66)-(67). Also, to ensure decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a helper lemma in [2] , i.e., [2,
. . , n}, and recalling that Ω appears in the conditioning of each term in (99), (100) follows using the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let X be an integer valued random variable satisfying (68), and h be drawn from a distribution F (h) satisfying
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix B. The constraint imposed in Lemma 2 is a mild technical condition. It can be verified that a sufficient condition for satisfying the constraint is that there exists an ǫ > 0 such that the probability density function (pdf) is bounded in the interval (−ǫ, ǫ). Most common distributions such as Gaussian, exponential and Laplace satisfy this condition. Eliminating H(X j )s using (92) and (100), we get,
where ǫ ′′ = o(log P ). Dividing by n and letting n → ∞,
Now dividing by 1 2 log P and taking P → ∞,
Bounding the Difference of Entropies
We now upper bound the difference of entropies H(Y) − H(Z) in (105) as:
where X |= Y is used to denote that X and Y are statistically independent and (107) follows from (106) by relaxing the condition of independence in (106). Since the X i s in (107) may be arbitrarily correlated, we can think of the K single antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to maximize H(Y) − H(Z), where Y and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs, under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter. This brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [9] . We know from [9, eqns. (75)- (103)] that even without any security or decodability constraints, the difference of entropies, H(Y) − H(Z) cannot be larger than no(log P ), if the channel gains to the second receiver are unknown. Thus,
Using (108) in (105), we have
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 3. We first present separate achievable schemes for fixed and fading channel gains and then present the converse. For the interference channel, we require asymptotic schemes with both real [8] , and vector space alignment [7] techniques. The converse combines techniques from [4] and [9] . Figure 5 : Alignment for the interference channel with K = 3.
Achievability for the Interference Channel
An achievable scheme for the interference channel with an external eavesdropper and no eavesdropper CSIT is presented in [26, Theorem 3] . That scheme achieves sum s.d.o.f. of
. Here, we present the optimal schemes which achieve
In this section, we focus on the case when K = 3, which highlights the main ideas of the general K-user scheme and present the K-user scheme in Appendix C. As in the achievability for the wiretap channel with helpers, we use the techniques of real and vector space alignment for fixed channel gains and fading channel gains, respectively. However, unlike the case of wiretap channel with helpers, we need to use asymptotic alignment in each case. We begin with the case of fixed channel gains.
Fixed Channel Gains
We use the technique of asymptotic real interference alignment introduced in [8] . Fig. 5 shows the desired signal alignment at the receivers and the eavesdropper. In the figure, the boxes labeled by V denote the message symbols, while the hatched boxes labeled with U denote artificial noise symbols. We observe from 
= 1. In the K-user case, we have a similar alignment scheme. Each transmitter sends two artificial noise blocks along with (K − 1) message blocks. At each legitimate receiver, the 2K noise blocks from the K transmitters align such that they occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions. This is done by aligningŨ k with U k+1 for k = 1, . . . , (K − 1), at each legitimate receiver. The unintended messages at each legitimate receiver are aligned underneath the (K + 1) artificial noise dimensions. To do so, we use two main ideas. First, two blocks from the same transmitter cannot be aligned at any receiver. This is because if two blocks from the same transmitter align at any receiver, they align at every other receiver as well, which is clearly not desirable. Secondly, each message block aligns with the same artificial noise block at every unintended receiver. Thus, in Fig. 5 , V 21 and V 24 appear in different columns at each receiver. Further, V 21 appears underneath U 1 at both of the unintended legitimate receivers 1 and 2. It can be verified that these properties hold for every message block. As an interesting by-product, this alignment scheme provides confidentiality of the unintended messages at the legitimate transmitters for free. The (K − 1) intended message blocks at a legitimate receiver occupy distinct block dimensions; thus, achieving a d.o.f. of
for each transmitter-receiver pair. At the eavesdropper, no alignment is possible since its CSIT is unavailable. Thus, the 2K artificial noise blocks occupy the full space of 2K block dimensions. This ensures security of the messages at the eavesdropper.
Note that we require two artificial noise blocks to be transmitted from each transmitter. When the eavesdropper CSIT is available, the optimal achievable scheme, presented in [5] , requires one artificial noise block from each transmitter; the K noise blocks from the K transmitters are aligned with the messages at the eavesdropper in order to ensure security. In our case, however, the eavesdropper's CSIT is not available. Thus, in order to guarantee security, we need a total of 2K noise blocks to occupy the full space of 2K block dimensions at the eavesdropper. This is achieved by sending two artificial noise blocks from each transmitter. Further, to achieve an s.d.o.f. of
per user pair, we need to create (K − 1) noise-free message block dimensions at each legitimate receiver. We ensure this by systematically aligning the 2K noise symbols to occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions at each legitimate receiver. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first achievable scheme in the literature that uses two artificial noise blocks from each transmitter and then aligns them to maximize the noise-free message dimensions at each legitimate receiver.
Let us now present the 3-user scheme in more detail. Let m be a large integer. Also, let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 and c 4 be real constants drawn from a fixed continuous distribution with bounded support independently of each other and of all the channel gains. This ensures that the c i s are rationally independent of each other and of the channel gains. Now, we define four sets T i , i = 1, . . . , 4, as follows: 
Let M i be the cardinality of the set T i . Note that all the M i s are the same, which we denote by M, which is given as,
We subdivide each message W i into 2 independent sub-messages V ij , j = 1, . . . , 4, j = i, i + 1.
For each transmitter i, let p ij be the vector containing all the elements of T j , for j = i, i + 1. For any given (i, j) with j = i, i + 1, p ij represents the dimension along which message V ij is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let q i andq i be vectors containing all the elements in sets T i and β i T i+1 , respectively, where
The vectors q i andq i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i , respectively, are sent. We define a 4M dimensional vector b i by stacking the p ij s, q i andq i as
The transmitter encodes V ij using an M dimensional vector v ij , and the cooperative jamming signals U i andŨ i using M dimensional vectors u i andũ i , respectively. Each element of v ij , u i andũ i are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from C(a, Q) in (16) . Let
The channel input of transmitter i is then given by
Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the receivers. For example, consider receiver 1. The desired signals at receiver 1, v 13 and v 14 arrive along dimensions h 11 T 3 and h 11 T 4 , respectively. Since only T i (and not T j , j = i) contains c i , these dimensions are rationally independent. Thus, they appear along different columns in Fig. 5 . The artificial noise symbols u 1 , u 2 , u 3 andũ 3 arrive along dimensions h 11 T 1 , h 21 T 2 , h 31 T 3 and h 31 T 4 , respectively. Again they are all rationally separate and thus, appear along different columns in Fig. 5 T 2 and T 3 , respectively; thus, they align with u 2 and u 3 inT 2 andT 3 , respectively. The unintended signals v 13 and v 14 arrive along h 12 T 3 and h 12 T 4 , respectively, and lie inT 3 andT 4 , respectively. Similarly, v 31 and v 32 lie inT 1 andT 2 , respectively. A similar analysis is true for receiver 3 as well.
At the eavesdropper, there is no alignment, since the channel gains of the eavesdropper are not known at the transmitters. In fact, the artificial noise symbols all arrive along different dimensions at the receiver. Thus, heuristically, they exhaust the decoding capability of the eavesdropper almost completely.
We note that the interference at each receiver is confined to the dimensionsT 1 ,T 2 ,T 3 andT 4 . Further, these dimensions are separate from the dimensions occupied by the desired signals at each receiver. Specifically, at receiver i, the desired signals occupy dimensions h ii T j , j = i, i + 1. These dimensions are separate fromT i andT i+1 , since only T j contains powers of c j . Further,T j , j = i, i + 1 do not contain powers of h ii . Thus, the set as m → ∞. Thus, the sum s.d.o.f. is 1. We omit the formal calculation of the achievable rate here and instead present it in Appendix C.1 for the general K-user case. Further, note that the unintended messages at each receiver are buried in artificial noise, see Fig. 5 . Thus, our scheme provides confidentiality of messages from unintended legitimate receivers as well.
Fading Channel Gains
Our scheme uses asymptotic vector space alignment introduced in [7] . Let Γ = (K − 1) 2 = (3 − 1) 2 = 4. We use M n = 2n Γ + 4(n + 1) Γ channel uses to transmit 6n Γ message symbols securely to the legitimate receivers in the presence of the eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 6n Γ 2n Γ +4(n+1) Γ , which approaches 1 as n → ∞. First, at transmitter i, we divide its message W i into 2 sub-messages V ij , j = 1, . . . , 4, j = i, i + 1. Each V ij is encoded into n Γ independent streams v ij (1), . . . , v ij (n Γ ), which we denote
We also require artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i at each transmitter i. We encode the artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i as
In each channel use t ≤ M n , we choose precoding column vectors p ij (t), q i (t) andq i (t) with the same number of elements as v ij , u i andũ i , respectively. In channel use t, transmitter i sends
where we have dropped the limits on j in the summation for notational simplicity. By stacking the precoding vectors for all M n channel uses, we let,
Now, letting X i = (X i (1), . . . , X i (M n )) T , the channel input for transmitter i over M n channel uses can be compactly represented as
Recall that, channel use t, the channel output at receiver l and the eavesdropper are, respectively, given by
where we have dropped the Gaussian noise at high SNR. Let H kl
The channel outputs at receiver l and the eavesdropper over all M n channel uses,
respectively, can be represented by
and,
Now, receiver l wants to decode v lj , j = 1, . . . , 4, j = l, l + 1. Thus, the remaining terms in (135) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Let CS(X) denote the column space of matrix X. Then, I l denoting the space spanned by this interference is given by
Note that there are 2n Γ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in 2n Γ + 4(n + 1) Γ channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference can occupy a subspace of rank at most 4(n + 1) Γ , that is,
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver appropriately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper since the transmitters do not have its CSI. In addition, note that we have a total of 2n Γ + 4(n + 1) Γ artificial noise symbols which will span the full received signal space at the eavesdropper and secure all the messages. Fig. 5 shows the alignment we desire. We remark that the same figure represents the alignment of signals both for real interference alignment and the vector space alignment schemes. Now, let us enumerate the conditions for the desired signal alignment at each receiver. From Fig. 5 , it is clear that there are 6 alignment equations at each legitimate receiver, corresponding to four unintended messages and two artificial noise symbolsŨ 1 and U 2 . Table 2 shows the alignment equations for each legitimate receiver. Now, me make the following selections: 
Note that (144) and (145) imply that the artificial noisesũ 1 andũ 2 align exactly with unintended message symbols v 32 and v 13 at receivers 1 and 2, respectively. With these selections, it suffices to find matricesP i , i = 1, . . . , 4, Q i , i = 1, 2, 3, andQ 3 . The alignment equations may now be written as
where the T ij s are tabulated in Table 3 , and the notation A B is used to denote that CS(A) ⊆ CS(B) for matrices A and B where CS(X) refers to the column space of the matrix X.
We can now construct the matricesP i , i = 1, . . . , 4, Q i , i = 1, . . . , 3 andQ 3 as in [7] 
where each w i is the M n × 1 column vector containing elements drawn independently from a continuous distribution with bounded support. Note that an element in P i is the product of powers of some channel coefficients and an extra random variable, just like an element in the sets T i defined for the real interference scheme. Further, the set of channel coefficients appearing in P i is the same as those contained in set T i . Thus, there is a loose correspondence between the real and vector space alignment techniques. Now, consider the decodability of the desired signals at the receivers. For example, consider receiver 1. Due to the alignment conditions in Table 2 , the interference subspace at receiver 1 is given by
The desired signal subspace, on the other hand, is
For decodability, it suffices to show that
is full rank. To do so, we use [31, Lemmas 1, 2] . Consider any row m of the matrix Λ 1 . Note that the mth row of H i1 Q i contains the term w mi with exponent 1, but no w mj for i = j, where w mi denotes the element in the mth row of w i . In fact, for i = 1, . . . , 4, the term w mi occurs nowhere else in the matrix Λ l except in H i1 Q i (H 31Q3 , when i = 4) and H 11Pi . This shows that D 1 and I 1 have full column ranks individually. Further, the matrix H 11P3 H 31 Q 3 has full column rank because Q 3 does not contain any elements of H 11 .
Similarly, H 11P4 H 31Q3 is full column rank for the same reason. Thus, Λ 1 , which is a M n × M n matrix, is full column rank, and hence full rank. This ensures decodability of the desired signals at receiver 1. a similar analysis holds for the other receivers as well. The security of the message signals at the eavesdropper is ensured by the fact that the artificial noises Q i andQ i , i = 1, 2, 3, do not align at the eavesdropper, and instead span the full received signal space at the eavesdropper. Indeed, the M n × M n matrix
is full rank. Thus, if V i = {v ij , j = i, i + 1} denotes the collection of all messages of transmitter i, and
=o(log P )
In the above calculation, we have dropped the conditioning on Ω for notational simplicity. Now, by treating all M n channel uses as 1 vector channel use, and using [4, Theorem 2], an achievable rate for the vector channel is
where (160) follows since the 2n Γ symbols are decodable within noise variance, and since 2n Γ +4(n+1) Γ , which approaches 1, as n → ∞. We remark here that our scheme also provides confidentiality, that is, the messages from transmitter i are kept secure from legitimate receiver j. We get this confidentiality without any additional loss of rate, just as in the case when eavesdropper CSI is available at the transmitters [4] .
Converse for the Interference Channel
The steps of the converse are similar to that of the proof in Section 4.2. The notation here is also the same as in Section 4.2. Again, we divide the proof into three steps.
Deterministic Channel Model
We consider the deterministic channel given as,
for k = 1, . . . , K, with the constraint that
We can show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the channel in (161)-(162) instead of the one in (8)- (9), as in Section 4.2.1. Thus, we will consider this deterministic channel in the remaining part of the converse. Since all receivers know Ω, it appears in the conditioning in every entropy and mutual information term below. We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity.
An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [2] , i.e., [2, Lemma 1] . Note that, unlike [2, Lemma 1], channel inputs are integer here:
where (170) 
for every i = j, where (179) follows using Lemma 2. Let Π be any derangement of (1, . . . , n), and let j = Π(i). Then, using (179), we obtain,
Using (180) in (171), we get,
Bounding the Difference of Entropies
As we did in Section 4.2.3, we enhance the system by relaxing the condition that channel inputs from different transmitters are mutually independent, and think of the K single antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to maximize
, where Y K and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs, under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter. This again brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [9] . We know from [9, eqns. (75)-(103)] that even without any security or decodability constraints, the difference of entropies, H(Y K ) − H(Z) cannot be larger than no(log P ), if the channel gains to the second receiver is unknown. Thus,
Using (185) in (184), we have
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we present achievable schemes that achieve sum s.d.o.f. of
, when m of the K transmitters have eavesdropper's CSI, for both fixed and fading channel gains. Figure 6 : Alignment of signals when K = 3 and m = 2.
Fixed Channel Gains
With fixed channel gains, we provide a scheme based on real interference alignment that achieves the required sum s.d.o.f. of
. In particular, it achieves the s.d.o.f. tuple
, 0, . . . , 0 . We employ m(K − 1) + K mutually independent random variables:
uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a, Q) in (16) . Transmitter i, i = 1, . . . , m transmits:
while transmitters (m + 1) to K transmit
The channel outputs are given by,
Intuitively, every V ij gets superimposed with U j at the eavesdropper, thus securing it. This is shown in Fig. 6 . The proof of decodability and security guarantee follows exactly the proof in [2, Section IX-B ] and is omitted here.
Fading Channel Gains
We construct a scheme that achieves the desired sum s.d.o.f. Without loss of generality, assume that the first m transmitters have eavesdropper CSI, while the remaining transmitters have no eavesdropper CSI. We provide a scheme to achieve the rate tuple (
, . . . , . For each i = 1, . . . , m, transmitter i sends V i = {V ij , , j = i, j = 1, . . . , K} symbols in m(K − 1) + 1 time slots. Let V = {V i , i = 1, . . . , K}. Fig. 6 illustrates the alignment of the signals at the end of the scheme when K = 3 and m = 2. The scheme is as follows:
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , m(K − 1) + 1}, the ith transmitter, i = 1, . . . , K, sends,
where U i is an artificial noise symbol. This ensures that the noise symbols U i all align at the legitimate receiver. On the other hand, the artificial noise symbol from the jth transmitter U j protects all the messages V ij for every i, at the eavesdropper. The channel outputs are given by, log P + o(log P ), and also I(V; Z) ≤ o(log P ), concluding the achievability proof.
Conclusions
In this paper, we established the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for three channel models: the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, and the K-user 
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Since AX + N is a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and covariance P AA T + σ 2 I, we have [32] ,
where we note that AA T is positive semi-definite, with an eigenvalue decomposition WΣW T ,
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with r non-zero entries λ 1 , . . . , λ r .
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that
Now, for a fixed h, let us define S h (ν) as the set of all realizations of X such that ⌊hX⌋ = ν, i.e., S h (ν)
For any ν, we can upper-bound |Sh(ν)| as follows: Let, i 1 and i 2 be the minimum and maximum elements of Sh(ν). Then, ⌊i 1h ⌋ = ⌊i 2h ⌋ implies that (i 2 − i 1 )|h| < 1, which means
. Hence,
Thus, using (198) and (199), we have,
where c is a constant independent of P .
Appendix C Achievability for the K-user Interference
Channel with an External Eavesdropper
Here, we present the general achievable schemes for the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
C.1 Fixed Channel Gains
Let m be a large constant. We pick (K + 1) points c 1 , . . . , c K+1 in an i.i.d. fashion from a continuous distribution with bounded support. Then, c 1 , . . . , c K+1 are rationally independent almost surely. Let us define sets T i , for i = 1, . . . , K + 1, which will represent dimensions as follows:
Let M i be the cardinality of T i . Note that all M i are the same, thus we denote them as M,
First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message of the ith transmitter, W i , is divided into (K − 1) sub-messages V ij , j = 1, . . . , K + 1, j = i, i + 1. For each transmitter i, let p ij be the vector containing all the elements of T j , for j = i, i + 1. For any given (i, j) with j = i, i + 1, p ij represents the dimension along which message V ij is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let q i andq i be vectors containing all the elements in sets T i and β i T i+1 , respectively, where
The vectors q i andq i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i , respectively, are sent. We define a (K + 1)M dimensional vector b i by stacking the p ij s, q i andq i as
Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the legitimate receivers. The alignment of the interfering signal spaces at receiver i is shown in Fig. 7 . The ith row depicts the signals originating from transmitter i. The signals in the same column align together at the receiver. For simplicity of exposition, let us consider receiver 1. At the first receiver, the desired signals v 13 , . . ., v 1(K+1) come along dimensions h 11 T 3 , . . ., h 11 T K+1 , respectively. These dimensions are separate almost surely, since T i contains powers of c i while T j , j = i does not. Thus, they correspond to separate boxes in the Fig. 5 for K = 3. For the same reason, cooperative jamming signals u 1 , . . ., u K ,ũ K , which arrive along the dimensions h 11 T 1 , . . ., h K1 T K , h K1 T K+1 occupy different dimensions almost surely. Further, the message signals v 13 , . . . , v 1(K+1) , and the cooperative jamming signals u 1 , . . . , u K ,ũ K do not overlap, since none of T 3 . . . , T K+1 contain h 11 . Thus, they appear as separate boxes in Fig. 5 . Now, let us consider the signals that are not desired at receiver 1. A signal v kl , k = 1, K+1 arrives at receiver 1 along h k1 T l . If we definẽ
we notice that the dimensions in h k1 T l , k = 1 are subsets ofT l , as is h l1 T l for every l = 1, . . . , K. Thus, each v kl aligns with u l inT l , for l = 1, . . . , K, as is shown in Fig. 7 . Further, a signal v k(K+1) , k = 1, K, arrives along the dimensions h k1 T K+1 , k = 1 which is a subset ofT K+1 , as is h K1 T K+1 , along whichũ K arrives. Thus, each v k(K+1) , k = 1, K aligns with u K , see Fig. 7 . Finally, the cooperative jamming signalsũ 1 , . . . ,ũ K−2 , andũ K−1 arrive at receiver 1 along dimensions h 31 T 2 , . . ., h K1 T K−1 , and h 12
T K , respectively, which are all inT 2 . . .,T K−1 andT K , respectively. Thus, the signalũ i , i = 1, . . . , K − 1 align with u i+1 inT i+1 , which is seen in Fig. 5 for K = 3, and in Fig. 7 for general K. We further note that the sets h 11 T 3 , . . ., h 11 T K+1 ,T 1 , . . .,T K+1 are all separable since only T i andT i (and not T j orT j ) contain powers of c i , and none ofT 3 , . . .,T K+1 contains h 11 . A similar observation holds for the received signal at any of the remaining receivers.
Thus, the set
has cardinality given by
At the external eavesdropper, there is no alignment and the cooperative jamming signals occupy the full space, thereby exhausting the decoding capability of the eavesdropper. This secures all the messages at the external eavesdropper.
We next provide an analysis for the achievable sum rate. Since we have only one eavesdropper, we use [4, Theorem 2] and observe that the rate
is achievable, where V i ia an auxiliary random variable satisfying V i → X i → Y, Z, and V −i denotes the collection {V j , j = i}. Note that since Ω is known at all the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper, and since V i s are chosen to be independent of Ω, Ω should appear in the conditioning of each of the mutual information quantities in (218). We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity. First, we can upper bound the probability of error at each receiver. Let
Then, for any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is independent of P , such that if we choose Q = P , then for almost all channel gains the average power constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded by
where η γ i is a positive constant which is independent of P andV i is the estimate for V i obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on observation Y i . By Fano's inequality and the Markov chain V i → Y i →V i , we know that,
where o(·) is the little-o function, V i is the alphabet of V i and, in this case, the cardinality of V i is (2Q + 1)
Now, we bound the second term in (218). Let
We have,
Now, combining (227) and (234), we have,
By choosing δ small enough and choosing m large enough, we can make R i arbitrarily close to
. Thus, the sum s.d.o.f. of
is achievable with fixed channel gains.
C.2 Fading Channel Gains
Here, we present a scheme that achieves
s.d.o.f. using asymptotic vector space alignment with channel extension. Let Γ = (K − 1)
2 . We use M n = (K − 1)n Γ + (K + 1)(n + 1) Γ channel uses to transmit K(K − 1)n Γ message symbols securely to the legitimate receivers in the presence of the eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of
as n → ∞. First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message of the ith transmitter, W i , is divided into (K − 1) sub-messages V ij , j = 1, . . . , K + 1, j = i, i + 1.
Each V ij is encoded into n Γ independent streams v ij (1), . . . , v ij (n Γ ), which we denote as
We also require artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i at each transmitter i. Again, we encode the artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i as
Now, letting X i = (X i (1), . . . , X i (M n )) T , the channel input for all transmitter i over M n channel uses can be compactly represented as
Let H kl ∆ = diag (h kl (1), . . . , h kl (M n )). Similarly, define G k = diag (g k (1), . . . , g k (M n )). The channel outputs at receiver l and the eavesdropper over all M n channel uses, Y l = (Y l (1), . . . ,
T and Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(M n )) T , respectively, can be represented by 
Note that receiver l wants to decode v lj , j = 1, . . . , K +1, j = l, l+1. Thus, the remaining terms in (246) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Recall that CS(X) denotes the column space of the matrix X. Then, I l denoting the space spanned by this interference is
Note that there are (K − 1)n Γ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in (K − 1)n Γ + (K + 1)(n + 1) Γ channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference can occupy a subspace of rank at most (K + 1)(n + 1) Γ , that is,
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver appropriately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper since the transmitters do not have its CSI. However, note that we have a total of (K −1)n Γ +(K +1)(n+1) Γ artificial noise symbols which will span the full received signal space at the eavesdropper and secures all the messages. Fig. 5 shows the alignment for K = 3 receivers. For the general K-user case, Fig. 7 shows the alignment in the interfering signal dimensions. At receiver l, it is as follows: First, the artificial noise symbolsũ k is aligned with u k+1 , for every k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Thus, we have, (256) and (257), we have (K − 1) 2 alignment equations for each u k , k = 1, . . . , K andũ K , given by,
where the sets τ k , k = 1, . . . , K + 1 are given by
1l H kl , k ∈ {2, . . . , K} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l = k (265)
Kl H kl , k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l = k (266)
where,
kl H il , i / ∈ {k − 1, k} , l = i, l ∈ {1, . . . , K} We can now construct the matricesP k , k = 1, . . . , K + 1, Q k , k = 1, . . . , K andQ K as in [7] P k = 
where each w k is the M n × 1 column vector containing elements drawn independently from a continuous distribution with bounded support. This completes the description of our scheme. Decodability: By our construction, the interference space at legitimate receiver l is given by,
and clearly, rank(I l ) ≤ (K + 1)(n + 1) Γ
We only need to show that desired signals v lj , j = l, l + 1 fall outside I l . The desired signal space at receiver l is given by Further, if k = l, l +1, H kl Q k does not contain H ll and hence H llPk H kl Q k is full column rank. Finally, note that the lth transmitter does not transmit any message signals alongP k , when k = l, l + 1. Thus, the matrix Λ l is full rank almost surely. This ensures decodability of the desired signals at each receiver. Security guarantee: Let v = {v ij , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K} , j = i, i + 1}, that is, v is the collection of all legitimate messages to be secured from the eavesdropper. Also, let u = {u k ,ũ k , k = 1, . . . , K}, that is u is the collection of all the artificial noise symbols. We note that
≤ M n 2 log P − h(Au) + o(log P )
= M n 2 log P − M n 2 log P + o(log P )
where A is a M n × M n full rank matrix, and we have used Lemma 1 in (280). Also, we have implicitly used the fact that Ω appears in the conditioning of each mutual information and differential entropy term in the above calculation. Now, as before, by treating the vector channel with M n slots as one channel use, and using wiretap channel codes, we get, as n → ∞.
